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stunningly beautiful—let us imagine you are in Kamouraska, watching the sun set
over the St. Lawrence River—we surely should welcome that this person was filled
with joy, in spite of what seems a lack of sensitivity. Indeed, it might well be the case
that this particular sunset is very significant to that person in part because she does
not tend to enjoy this kind of beauty. Because this intuition depends on the avail-
ability of objective evaluative features, it is likely to be controversial. But then, it
might well be true nonetheless.
Acknowledgment: Thanks to Paul Boswell and to Carolyn Price for their
helpful comments.
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal
Sehon, Scott. Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-causal, Compatibilist Account.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. xi1235. $74.00 (cloth).
This is an ambitious, wide-ranging, well-informed, and carefully argued book. Its
main aim is to demonstrate that we have free will andmoral responsibility, that is,
that we have the responsibility of “desert,” which makes us appropriate subjects
for praise or blame and therefore deserving of punishment or reward. A second,
radical aim is to reshape those debates, since, Scott Sehon claims, they are “largely
informed by a false presupposition: the causal theory of action” (3), and to per-
suade the reader that his teleological theory is the ideal alternative to the causal
account of action explanation.
The book’s structure reflects this dual aim. After chapter 1, which explains
the rationale for the book, the remaining twelve chapters fall in two parts. In part 1,
comprising chapters 2–7, Sehon outlines and defends the claim that rational ex-
planations of human behavior are irreducibly teleological, and not causal. Part 2,
comprising chapters 8–13, applies this teleological account to the problem of free
will and responsibility. This yields a view Sehon calls “non-causal compatibilism,”
which, he argues, undermines incompatibilist arguments and is preferable to its
compatibilist rivals. Moreover, it is claimed in the last chapter that non-causal com-
patibilism has the resources to explain the puzzle arising from the fact that com-
patibilism and incompatibilism both “seem to have something going for them”
(215).
Sehonbeginsby arguing against skeptics of all stripes that the questionwhether
we have free will and desert responsibility is genuine and pressing for, he says,
without such responsibility, our practices of praise and blame, punishment and
responsibility, and the attitudes that he sees as underlying those responses (indig-
nation, gratitude, shame, etc.) cannot be properly justified. Attempts (e.g., by
Derk Pereboom) to find alternative justifications fail: in the absence of genuine
desert, Sehon claims, those practices and attitudes would be rendered “hollow
and manipulative,” and the world would be “deeply depersonalized” (20).
The central idea of the teleological account is that we explain agents’ ac-
tions by constructing theories that make sense of them in terms of rationality, in-
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terpreting agents so that they come out to be as rational as possible given certain
constraints. To do this, Sehon says, we assume that agents (i) “act in ways that are
appropriate for achieving their goals” and (ii) “have goals that are of value,” in
both cases relative to “their circumstances, epistemic situation, and intentional
states” (27). Moreover, in interpreting agents, (iii) we try to make sense of their
overall behavior, and not just of actions in isolation, and (iv) we “also take into
account what we believe the agent would do in related circumstances” (28). In
other words, we explain actions by attributing to agents both goals and beliefs
about appropriate ways to achieve them, and in so doing we are constrained by
judgments about the value and consistency of agents’ goals and the coherence
of their behavior considered diachronically and counterfactually. (It is somewhat
ironic that Sehon’s theory is explicitly closely modeled on Davidson’s views on in-
terpretation and his Principle of Charity [Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth
and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984)], given the latter’s role in establish-
ing the causal theory of action explanation as the dominant orthodoxy.)
A second core idea of the theory is that teleological explicability, rationality,
freedom, responsibility, and (less plausibly) agency are not “an all-or-nothing af-
fair” but come in degrees. I’ll come back to how this idea plays out in the free will
debate. For now, the point helps one to see how Sehon responds to the immedi-
ately obvious objection that people are often irrational and act irrationally: since
the theory allows for degrees of rationality, it can accommodate occasional irra-
tionality by all, and even frequent and intense irrationality by some. Sehon ar-
gues—convincingly, in my view—against claims by social scientists (e.g., Daniel
Kahneman, J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler, “Experimental Tests of the Endow-
ment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy 98 [1990]: 1325–
48) that we are all in fact systematically irrational.
He also engages carefully with other objections directly targeted at his ac-
count. Reasons of space precludeme from commenting on them all, so I shall con-
fine myself to an objection raised by Alfred Mele about agent manipulation. The
issue boils down to whether an agent whose limbs are caused tomove (e.g., byMar-
tians, or some unusual mechanism) in ways that realize his intentions and accord
with his goals and beliefs could rightly be said to be acting. In such cases the teleo-
logical account dictates that the agent is acting intentionally, since his ‘behavior’
can be rationalized appropriately. But, Mele urges, the nature of themanipulation
suggests that the agent is not acting, never mind acting intentionally.
Sehon’s response is that, insofar as themanipulation is really perfectly respon-
sive to the agent’s psychology, the agent is indeed acting: the “godlike reliable”ma-
nipulating device (and associated agents), he suggests, are just a causal mechanism
through which the agent executes his intentions, which is, admittedly, more ob-
lique and unusual than, but nonetheless not different in the relevant sense from,
the causalmechanisms throughwhichwe, ordinary agents, execute ours. Sehon seeks
to buttress this response by asking us to consider how we would judge the agent if
what he did through such manipulation was morally significant, for instance,
shooting someone dead. Surely, he says, “in this scenario, we would not let [the
agent] go free, nor would we merely charge him with having had a plan to com-
mit murder” (58).
Sehon mentions Malebranche in this context, and appropriately so since
this is in effect a modern-day version of the eighteenth-century dispute about
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whether, as Thomas Reid put it, the possibility that our volitions have no “phys-
ical effect upon the nerves and muscles” and may be, rather, “only an occasion of
their being acted upon by some other efficient” (Thomas Reid, Essays on the Ac-
tive Powers of the Human Mind [original title: Essays on the Active Powers of Man,
1788; repr., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969], 50) undermines our status as gen-
uine agents. Reid’s own view was that “the man who knows that such an event
depends upon his will, and who deliberately wills to produce it, is, in the strictest
moral sense, the cause of the event; and it is justly imputed to him, whatever phys-
ical causes may have concurred in its production” (Reid, Essays, 51).
So Reid and Sehon agree that what matters for moral assessment is what one
intends and decides to do, regardless of the causal mechanisms through which
the desired outcomes are brought about. However, emphasizing that, in the imag-
ined scenarios, the agent would be the cause of the event “in the strictest sense,”
as Reid puts it, and thus morally blameworthy, does not address the worry that
such an agent would not, strictly speaking, be acting. It is only if one accepts
Sehon’s other point, that agents do cause the relevant outcomes, albeit in unusual
ways, that one will think that Sehon’s response succeeds.
In the last three chapters of part 1, Sehon goes on the offensive, offering a
series of trenchant objections to the causal theory. Chapter 5 argues that causal
accounts cannot explain why, as they claim, we use rationalizing principles in or-
der to identify causes in reason explanations but “we would never use rationaliz-
ing principles to determine the cause of an event” (74) in any other context, since
“this would be a laughably silly method” (89) to use in those contexts. The con-
clusion is that in fact “we do not treat rationalizability as a mere heuristic for find-
ing the right cause” (88)—where by “right cause” Sehon means right physical
cause. This is evidence that “reason explanation is not causal but sui generis” (89).
Chapter 6 is devoted to the familiar problem of deviant causal chains, where Sehon
gives convincing arguments that several attempts to solve this problem fail. This
failure shows that rationalizations, which presumably everyone agrees are teleo-
logical, cannot be analyzed in terms of goals, beliefs (or other mental states),
and causation. It does not show that rationalizations are not also causal in charac-
ter (see below), though the failure is instructive. Chapter 7 turns to a different,
original, and subtle objection, which goes roughly as follows. The causal theory
implies that commonsense psychology is committed to the view that “mental
states, if they exist at all, are identifiable with physical states” (110). But common-
sense psychology is not committed to that view. Therefore, the causal theory is
false.
Though the arguments in these three chapters are careful and generally
persuasive, there is a question about their scope. Sehon’s target is a causal theory
that holds that in identifying the cause of an action (the reason), we are thereby
identifying the physical cause(s) of the bodily motions involved in the action. And
Sehon seems to see this as committing the causal theorist to a particular view
about the significance of the theory, namely, that identifying a physical cause is a
first step in a project of reducing, or even translating, psychological explanations
to physical explanations. No doubt some causal theorists are so committed and
motivated. But other causal theorists may see the significance of their position as
lying elsewhere. They may agree with the would-be reductionist that rational ex-
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planations of human behavior are causal explanations, but insist that they are ir-
reducible and sui generis, since they are constrained by principles of rationality,
and no other causal explanations are so constrained. That, after all, was David-
son’s position. Again, John Hyman (Action, Knowledge, and Will [Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015]) argues that explanations of intentional action are causal
but also irreducibly teleological, on the grounds that desires are dispositions that
are manifested in goal-directed behavior. I am not claiming that these causalists
are right, only that these versions of the causal theory seem to fall outside the
target range of views that Sehon’s arguments are intended to bring down, since
he focuses on views that assume that giving reason explanations is, as he puts it,
ultimately a heuristic device for finding the corresponding physical explana-
tions. But that is a project about reducing psychological to physical explanations
that a causalist needn’t endorse, and which Davidson explicitly disavowed through
his commitment to anomalous monism.
I now turn to Sehon’s discussion of free will andmoral responsibility in part 2,
where he deploys his teleological account of action explanation to articulate a
compatibilist view of free will and determinism. The discussion covers an impres-
sive range of issues, and it is impossible to do justice to its complexity here. I
think that Sehon is most convincing in arguing that when we rationalize actions,
we take no account of determinism, whether the actions we explain are more or
less rational, ordinary actions, or extraordinary ones, such as the actions of psy-
chopaths or the brainwashed, coerced actions, or those done in Frankfurt-style
scenarios. Peter Strawson made this general point (“Freedom and Resentment,”
Proceedings of the British Academy 48 [1962]: 1–25), and Sehon claims that his the-
ory can explain why, since, on the teleological account, “whether a behaviour is
free comes down to whether it is teleologically explicable” (174), not whether it was
caused at all, let alone whether its occurrence could be subsumed under a deter-
ministic causal law. If that is right, then, he also argues, the teleological account
undermines certain arguments for incompatibilism that focus on “how our be-
haviours have been caused” (174). This is a suggestive claim, plausible on the face
of it, though, of course, its plausibility depends on whether Sehon’s teleological
account of free action is satisfactory. It is not clear to me that it is.
For Sehon, free actions can be straightforwardly identified with “actions for
which we are responsible 5 intentional actions 5 goal-directed actions” (129).
This, together with the earlier claim that goal-directedness and rationality are
a matter of degree, allows Sehon to argue that freedom and responsibility also
come in degrees. He summarizes the view as follows: “Behaviors that are less than
fully rational are therefore less fully cases of action, and thus less free. Accordingly,
an agent’s responsibility is at least mitigated somewhat if the behavior was not
rational” (145).
Sehon insists that this is preferable to a view that says that freedom and re-
sponsibility are a matter of “all or nothing.” Perhaps. But the identifications are
not unproblematic. For instance, there are things for which we aremorally respon-
sible that are not, in any plausible sense, goal directed: negligent but unintentional
omissions, and failures to care for the right things or care for them in the right way,
for example.Moreover, animals and small infants are capable of goal-directed and,
by the teleological account’s criteria, rational behavior: they act in ways that are ap-
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propriate for achieving their valued goals, given their circumstances, epistemic sit-
uation, and intentional states. Sehon claims this as a virtue of the account because
it allows us to seehow thedegreeof rationality increases with the increaseof psycho-
logical sophistication, either within the development of an individual human or in
“a spectrumof different sorts of animals” (139–40; see also 30). But if the actions of
animals and infants are goal directed, then it would seem that, according to the tel-
eological theory, they are also free actions for which their agents are morally re-
sponsible, even if to a far lesser degree than fully developed adult humans. This
is implausible (and, I assume, not a consequence Sehon would welcome): con-
cerningmoral responsibility, the difference between us, on the one hand, and an-
imals and infants, on the other, is not a matter of degree but of kind: infants and
animals are not proper subjects of moral responsibility.
Finally, I am not convinced that the notion of rational action can do the work
that the teleological theory of freedom and moral responsibility requires it to do.
Sehon uses both “subjective” and “objective” criteria for rational actions. Thus, he
suggests that, relative to his beliefs and desires, the actions of a bank robber (Rob-
ert AltonHarris, a real-life example discussed in Gary Watson, “Responsibility and
the Limits of Evil,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions [Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1987], 256–86) who brutally kills two innocent young wit-
nesses and then eats their unfinished burgers—he was hungry!—are rational.
However, the objective criterion “makes it more difficult to rationalize some of
his behaviors” since he has “subhuman values: he is callously indifferent to the
value of human life” (166). Many (e.g., Hume) have been skeptical that being ra-
tional is at all a matter of having objectively good values. But putting that aside,
the theory has some unwelcome consequences. Sehon notes that the teleological
theory gives a mixed verdict in this case: Harris was rational, and so responsible
and blameworthy—but only to a degree. Since it turns out that Harris had had
an appalling upbringing, which arguably diminishes responsibility and blamewor-
thiness, the verdict fits the case.
The problem is that, according to the teleological theory, anyone with the
wrong values would come out as only partially rational, and hence only partially
morally responsible and blameworthy. Sehon attempts to deflect this implication
by arguing that someone who had a morally sound education and had greater ra-
tional capacities but ended up with “a warped view of other human beings” had
“more capacity to see the error of his ways; he was less impervious to good reason”
(166). Therefore, he would be more rational and hence more morally responsi-
ble than, say, Harris, on Sehon’s view. But although I agree that this would be the
right verdict, I cannot see how the teleological view would yield it. First, an agent
who has a greater capacity to understand themoral reasons that apply to him, and
is even familiar with them, but disregards them strikesme asmore rather than less
impervious to good reason than someone who has lesser capacity or experience
of the values. If we partially exonerate the latter, it is because we imagine that, with
a sound upbringing and higher rational capacity, he might have acted better. But
the former had both and yet doesn’t act better. Second, as we saw above, the tel-
eological view says that “an agent’s responsibility is at least mitigated somewhat
if the behaviour was not rational” (145). The criterion for rationality, freedom,
moral responsibility, and blameworthiness on the teleological view, then, is not
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an agent’s rational capacities but the nature of his overall behavior: how rational
that is. And, according to the theory, behavior that manifests “subhuman values”
is thereby irrational and so not fully free, blameworthy, and so on.
While some readers will remain unconvinced by Sehon’s position, its force-
ful and distinctive arguments are undoubtedly a welcome contribution to many
of the debates that have dominated the theory of action in the past fifty years.
Maria Alvarez
King’s College London
Shaw, William R. Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War.
New York: Routledge, 2016. Pp. 196. $155.00 (cloth); $44.95 (paper).
Nonconsequentialist approaches to military ethics have enjoyed supremacy as
long as the tradition has existed. It is the conventional wisdom that utilitarianism
was at best moot on the subject or at worst downright hostile to widely accepted
moral constraints on declaring and fighting war. Utilitarians have chafed at this
rejection, though a thoroughgoing defense of utilitarianism’s ability to contrib-
ute to discussions of the morality of war has been lacking. This is surprising, given
that war has been perhaps the most consequential enterprise in human history
and, as Shaw points out in his second chapter, given the attention that the classi-
cal utilitarians—including Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill, and Sidgwick—
paid to the conduct of war. Where utilitarianism has established a beachhead, it
is only on the margins of these discussions, for example, when Walzer grudgingly
accepts a threshold utilitarian calculus into his doctrine of supreme emergency.
In this atmosphere, which is at turns dismissive and hostile, it is refreshing to see a
contribution to the literature as lucid, thorough, and well argued as William
Shaw’s Utilitarianism and the Ethics of War.
Shaw’s project is to argue that it has been a profound mistake to count util-
itarians out of these discussions and that, in fact, utilitarianism provides the most
satisfying unifying account of the rules of warfare, both ad bellum and in bello. The
book is compelling, and its arguments are executed with an impressive economy
of words, but any project of such ambition cannot hope to answer every question
decisively in 166 pages. I will make a few brief remarks indicating where I expect
readers to remain suspicious. I will suggest where I think there is work left to be
done for utilitarians, now that Shaw has provided a promising framework.
Shaw’s chief contribution to discussions of jus ad bellum is the UtilitarianWar
Principle, which he defends in his third chapter and returns to repeatedly:
Utilitarian War Principle (UWP):
It is morally right for a state to wage war if and only if no other course of
action available to it has greater expected well-being; otherwise, waging war
is wrong. (47)
The Utilitarian War Principle is implied by utilitarianism, though this implica-
tion flows in only that direction—we can accept this principle without being
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